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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an Order by the District Court, enjoining the Appellant from 
conducting trucking and/or hay hauling operations of any kind from the subject property located 
at 2319 East 4000 North, Filer, Idaho. The District Court concluded that '''trucking and/or hay 
hauling operations' includes, but is not limited to parking, storing, driving onto or from, 
maintaining in any manner, however slight, any and all equipment, trucks and trailers used in any 
trucking business on the subj ect property located at 2319 East 4000 North, Filer, Idaho." R. p. 
103. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On May 21, 2009, a court trial was held on the Respondent's Complaint, seeking an 
injunction to prohibit the Appellant from using the subject property, zoned R-A Residential 
Agricultural District, for trucking and/or hay hauling operations. On August 21, 2009, the 
District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order granting the relief 
sought in the Complaint. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The evidence established that the Appellant resided at 2319 East 4000 North, Filer, 
Idaho. This property is outside the City of Filer, but inside the area of city impact as established 
by ordinances adopted by the City of Filer and the County of Twin Falls. The property is zoned 
R-A Residential Agricultural District, and is part of a small lot residential subdivision on the 
outskirts of Filer, Idaho. 
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The Appellant developed the front (northerly) portion of the property as his residence. 
His residence occupies approximately one-quarter to one-third of the 1.11 acres of the residential 
subdivision lot. The remaining two-thirds to three-quarters of the residential subdivision lot 
were developed as a parking lot/secure storage yard for the Appellant's semi-trucks and trailers 
and equipment used for his trucking business. The parking lot has been completely paved with 
recycled asphalt paving material, is surrounded by a six-foot high chain link fence topped by two 
strands of barbed wire, is lighted with a yard light, and is monitored with cameras. In addition to 
four semi-trucks, the Appellant parked three sets of hay trailers (total of six trailers), plus a belly 
dump trailer, a front loader used for loading large bales of hay, and other miscellaneous items 
related to the trucking and hay hauling operation on the residential lot. The Appellant 
periodically did maintenance on the trucks and trailers on the residential lot, and also hired 
seasonal employees to operate his trucks from the property during the haying season. 
The next door neighbors complained to the City of Filer and Twin Falls County Planning 
and Zoning about the problems associated with the trucking operation. They testified that the 
noise, vibration, and diesel smoke coming from the Appellant's property, especially during the 
early morning hours, is extremely disturbing to the residential use and enjoyment of their own 
residential property. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented on appeal by the Appellant is whether the District Court erred in finding 
that the Appellant's use of the subject property was in violation of the R-A Residential Agricultural 
zoning of the property. 
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The second issue presented is whether the County should be entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code § 12-121, and costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 40. 
V.ARGUMENT 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. At all times relevant, Appellant resided at 2319 East 4000 North, Filer, Idaho. Tr. p. 
108, L. 2. 
2. The subject property lies outside the Filer city limits, but is within the City's area of 
city impact ("area of impact") as designated by Twin Falls County Ordinance §8-9-19(C). 
Exhibits 1 and 2. Twin Falls County Code § 8-9-19(C)(2) adopts the City of Filer's zoning 
regulations by reference and makes such regulations applicable to the area of impact. Tr. p. 14, 
L. 7-25. Exhibits 2 and 3. 
3. Filer's zoning and subdivision regulations govern land use issues within the area 
of impact. Exhibits 2 and 3. 
4. The area of impact zoning map, as adopted by Filer and the County defines the area 
of impact. Exhibit 1. 
5. The area of impact zoning map designates the subject property as lying within an R-A 
Residential Agricultural District, within Filer's area of impact. Exhibit 1. Tr. p. 14, L. 9. 
6. Filer City Code §9-5-2 provides the use regulations for R-A Residential Agricultural 
District. The R-A Residential Agricultural District is "intended to provide areas for low density 
residential development and continuation of farm uses where compatible with each other." 
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Exhibit 5. 
7. The following uses are permitted in the R-A Residential Agricultural District: 
a Cemeteries. 
b. Churches and religious facilities. 
c. Home occupations, suburban, rural or external. 
d. Noncommercial public parks and recreation grounds and buildings. 
e. One- and two-family dwellings. 
f The growing of soil crops, including all farming, livestock and poultry raising 
activities. 
8. The ordinance prohibits any use not specified in the ordinance, "unless administrative 
determination is made that the use is similar enough to a use listed [in the ordinance] that [the] 
distinction between them is of little consequence." Filer City Code §9-5-2 (C). Exhibit 4. 
9. Appellant maintains his personal residence on the subject property. Tr. p. 108, L. 2. 
The residence is a one-family home, approximately 2000 square feet, with the front (northerly) 
one-quarter to one-third of the subject property containing the residence. Tr. p. 113, L. 1-4. The 
remaining three-quarters to two-thirds of the residential lot is covered by recycled asphalt. Tr. p. 
136, L. 18-25, P. 137, L. 1. The witnesses generally called this area a parking lot. Tr. p. 50, L. 
10-17. 
10. The entire parking lot is paved with recycled asphalt paving material. Tr. Pp. 131-
132. It is surrounded by a six-foot high chain-link fence topped by two strands of barbed wire, 
lighted with a yard light, and is monitored by security cameras. Tr. p. 126. Overall, there is very 
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little difference between the Appellant's parking lot and any other secure storage yard in a 
commercial or industrial area. R. p. 77 
11. Appellant has parked as many as four semi-trucks, six semi-trailers, a belly dump 
trailer, a large front loader, and other miscellaneous items, in the secured parking lot. Tr. p. 47-
49. 
12. Appellant has also had employees who drive his trucks for him come to the 
property, park for the day while driving the hay trucks, and leave at the end of the day. Tr. p. 
53, L. 6-25. 
13. A digital video recording (DVD) admitted in evidence in the trial court shows the 
Appellant driving his semi onto the property, parking, and letting the truck idle while cleaning it. 
The idling semi is very noisy and creates vibration that is noticeable on the recording. The DVD 
also shows a number of other items of personal property consistent with equipment maintenance, 
including a ladder, a garbage can, 5-gallon buckets and other containers and tarps consistent with 
maintenance-storage. The DVD also shows workers performing maintenance on a truck while on 
the property. Exhibit 6. 
14. The DVD also records loud noise coming from a semi truck on the subject property 
during night-time hours. Exhibit 6. The testimony at trial was that this occurred at all hours of 
the night, as late as 11 :00 p.m. to as early as 3 :00 a.m. Tr. p. 51, L. 2-22. 
15. The Appellant's next door neighbors, the Nielsons, complained to both City and 
County officials about the trucking and/or hay hauling operation being conducted next door to 
them, and the adverse impact of the noise, smoke and vibration on the residential use and 
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enjoyment of their residential property. Tr. p. 51, L. 2-22. 
B. STANDARD OF REVEW 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, which is to 
say that findings that are based upon substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence 
will not be disturbed on appeal. DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571,976 P.2d 
922, 925 (1999). 
C. LEGAL AUTHORITY APPLIED TO RELEV ANT FACTS 
This case presents the Court with issues of statutory interpretation and application of the 
Filer City Code §9-5-1, et seq. to the facts noted above. Statutory interpretation presents a legal 
question, which must be resolved beginning "with an examination of the statute's literal words." 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Where the language ofa statute 
is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). "Only where 
the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider 
the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,231,31 P.3d 248, 253 
(2001)." Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agriculture, 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 
P.3d 632, 634 (2006). 
Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, ordinary words will be given 
their ordinary meaning when construing a statute.... In construing a statute, this Court 
will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect 
to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word 
therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions .... 
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Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue. 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d 458 (Idaho 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
"The comprehensive plan and subsequent amendments thereto together with the zoning 
and subdivision ordinances and subsequent amendments thereto, as officially adopted by the city 
and all national and state uniform codes so adopted, shall apply to the agreed upon area of city 
impact." Twin Falls County Code §8-9-19(C)(2). Filer City Code §9-5-2(A) sets forth permissible 
uses within the R-A Residential Agricultural District where the subject property is located. 
The ordinance in question is a "permissive zoning ordinance." A permissive zoning 
ordinance "is drawn to show those uses which are permitted for a particular district, and any use 
which is not expressly permitted in a given zone or district is thereby excluded from it." State ex 
reI. Barnett v. Sappington 266 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Mo. App. 1954). The Filer ordinance prohibits 
those uses not specified in the ordinance: "Uses not specified above are prohibited unless 
administrative determination is made that the use is similar enough to a use listed above that 
distinction between them is oflittle consequence." Filer City Code §9-5-2(C). 
The definitions of permitted uses in §9-5-2(A) are plain and unambiguous, and the statute 
readily provides notice of those uses that are allowed in the R-A Residential Agricultural 
District. Conspicuously absent from the permitted uses is any type of trucking operation. For 
purposes of the issues presented in this case, any use not specified is prohibited. That 
pronouncement is straightforward on its face and not subject to multiple interpretations. 
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Therefore, Appellant has failed to establish that his use is either: 1) specified in the 
ordinance, or 2) an ancillary use of his residential property. Whether the required burden of proof 
on a particular issue has been met is a question for the trier of fact. County of 
Canyon v. Wilkerson, 123 Idaho 377,848 P.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re Estate of Bogert, 96 
Idaho 522, 526, 531 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1975)). 
The ordinance provides that a one-family dwelling, such as Appellant's home, is clearly 
allowed in this zone. Moreover, the intent of the regulation is to provide for both "low density 
residential development and continuation of farm uses where compatible with each other." Id. 
§9-5-1. Nothing that Appellant is doing regarding his trucks is part of a farming operation at the 
subject property. While his trucks haul hay from farmers to buyers, his business is trucking, not 
farming. It is beyond dispute that trucking is not a permitted use in the R-A zone under the city 
ordinance. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed accessory uses of property under a zoning dispute. 
See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ashton, 92 
Idaho 571, 574, 448 P.2d 185, 188 (1968). The Court there noted that "[w]here use for [certain] 
purposes is allowed in a zone, uses customarily incidental or accessory to [those] uses may not 
be excluded or unduly restricted. But such incidental uses must be reasonably closely related, both in 
substance and in space, to the main [allowed] purpose." (Emphasis added). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals also ruled upon this issue in City of Boise City v. Gabica, 106 Idaho 94,675 P.2d 354, 356 
(Ct.App. 1984). There the court interpreted a city ordinance's definition of "accessory uses" and 
held that it is clear as a matter of law that operating a business was not "incidental" to residential 
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use of single-family dwelling. Another case provided a similar definition: "A valid accessory 
use to a single-family dwelling is one which actually furthers or enhances the use of the property 
as a residence and not one which merely helps finance the property." Lerner v. Bloomfield 
Township, 106 Mich.App. 809,308 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1981). See also Whaley v. Dorchester County 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 337 S.c. 568,579,524 S.E.2d 404,410 (1999): 
Accessory uses are those which are customarily incident to the principal use. "In order to 
qualify as a use incidental to the principal use of a nonconforming premises, such use 
must be clearly incidental to, and customarily found in connection with, the principal use 
to which it is allegedly related." ... An accessory use must be one "so necessary or 
commonly to be expected that it cannot be supposed that the ordinance was intended to 
prevent it." 
(Citations omitted). 
Here the Appellant's trucking business is not so necessary or commonly to be expected, or 
so closely related, both in substance and in space, to his main purpose, which is to live on the 
residential property, that the trucking activities can be called an incidental use to his residing 
there. To apply the Michigan definition in Lerner, supra, Appellant's helping to finance his 
property through a trucking business does nothing to further or enhance the use of his home. 
There does not appear to be any Idaho case with significant factual similarity to this case 
to give guidance. However, authority from other jurisdictions, have nearly uniformly determined 
that parking heavy trucks or equipment in a residential, or residential-agricultural zone, is not a 
use incidental to residential use. See, ~ Potts v. City of Hugo, 416 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. App. 
1988) (holding as a matter of law that parking a semi-truck and trailer is not customarily 
incidental to a residential use); Galliford v. Commonwealth, 60 Pa.Cmwlth. 175, 179,430 A.2d 
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1222, 1224 (1981) (14,500 pound, commercially registered truck is not accessory to a residential 
use; it is commercial in nature); St. Louis County v. Taggert, 866 S.W.2d 181 (Missouri App. 1993) 
(The parking of defendants' dump trucks used in their gravel hauling business can hardly be said 
to be an accessory use. The Court held, "as a matter of law, that the parking of such trucks is not 
a use which 'serves only' to further the successful utilization of the primary residential use, and 
therefore is not an accessory use within the County's zoning ordinance."); Taddeo v. 
Commonwealth, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 485, 412 A.2d 212 (1980), zoning violation upheld where a 
business owner parked heavy equipment on his residential property, concluding that: 
The use of the equipment parked at Appellant's home and in the vacant lot adjacent to it 
is such an integral part of Appellant's business, which is certainly commercial in nature, 
as to be inseparable from that business. By parking the equipment at his residence, 
Appellant has transferred that part of his commercial enterprise to a residential site, something 
the zoning ordinance will not permit him to do. 
Id. 412 A.2d at 213 (Emphasis added). These cases are striking in their factual similarity to this 
case and they support the District Court's decision. 
Appellant cites the activities of neighbors as evidence to support his claim that his 
parking of equipment is "the kind of use normally incidental" to the residential use in his 
neighborhood. The activities cited are dissimilar in scope and nature to the scope and nature of 
Appellant's activities. As an aside, Appellant has failed to establish selective enforcement or 
discriminatory enforcement practices on the part of the County or the City in this case. As such, 
the County's failure to enforce the ordinance against others in Appellant's subdivision is not a 
defense regarding Appellant's conduct in this case. See City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp., 218 
Ill.App.3d 242, 578 N.E.2d 194 (1991 ) (city was not estopped from enforcing ordinance even 
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though it had issued permit for signs for over 15 years, and its failure to prosecute other obvious 
violators did not violate equal protection absent showing that selection of owner was based on 
some invidious classification); Whaley v. Dorchester County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 337 S.c. 568, 
576-577, 524 S.E.2d 404,408-409 (1999) (discriminatory enforcement not established where, even 
though trucker presented eleven photographs of "other large commercial vehicles in the 
immediate area that were not subjected to any enforcement action," he failed to establish any 
purposeful discrimination on the part of the planning and zoning officials.). 
The District Court recognized, as did the Court in City of Boise City v. Gabica, 106 Idaho 
94,675 P.2d 354 (1984), that "a residential use may have many components." As the Gabica court 
stated: 
Use by a family of a home under our customs includes more than simple use of a house 
and grounds for food and shelter. It also includes its use for private religious, educational, 
cultural and recreational advantages of the family. Pursuit of a hobby is clearly 
customarily a part of recreational activities. 
Id. (quoting Borough of Chatham v. Donaldson 69 N.J.Super. 277, 174 A.2d 213,216 
(1961 )). Appellant's business operation, however, does not fit within any of these components of 
residential living. Appellant's operation of his trucking business starts and ends with parking and 
maintaining his trucking assets. The court in Gabica stated: 
Our characterization of the business is consistent with the general view that a commercial 
enterprise, conducted to make money, is a principal use, of itself, and is not occasioned by 
day-to-day living in a residential area. See, e.g., Perron v. City of Concord 102 N.H. 32,150 
A.2d 403 (1959). It is also consistent with Idaho case law that an "accessory use" will be 
recognized where it is "sufficiently connected with," and an "integral part" of, the 
principal land use. 
106 Idaho at 96, 675 P.2d at 356. 
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Appellant argues, not that the trucking and/or hay hauling operation is an accessory or 
incidental use to his residential property, but rather, that it is "fanning". This argument fails because 
the Appellant is not engaged in "[t]he growing of soil crops, including all fanning, livestock and 
poultry raising activities" on the subject property, as pennitted by Filer City Code §9-5-2(A). He 
argues that this trucking and/or hay hauling operation could be accessory to or incidental to a fanning 
operation, if the subject property was a fann instead of residential property. Since no portion of the 
subject property is used for fanning (the growing of soil crops, including all fanning, livestock and 
poultry raising activities), Appellant's trucking and/or hay hauling operation is not an incidental or 
accessory use to fanning on the subject property. 
The flaw in the Appellant's argument can be illustrated by examples of other uses that could 
be incidental or accessory to a fanning use, if they were located on a fann and incidental or accessory 
to that farm. Fanners often perfonn repair work on their fann equipment and trucks, so the Appellant 
would argue that an independent tractor repair shop or truck repair shop should be pennitted to be 
established in a residential subdivision in the R-A Residential Agricultural District. Fanners often 
maintain their own grain storage facilities on their fanns, so the Appellant would argue that an 
independent grain elevator and storage facility should be pennitted in a residential subdivision in the 
R-A Residential Agricultural District. Fanners often spray herbicides and pesticides on their crops 
using their own equipment, so the Appellant would argue that an independent spraying operation 
should be allowed to be established in a residential subdivision in the R-A Residential Agricultural 
District. Surely, there are more examples offann-related activities that would be considered incidental 
or accessory to a fanning operation, if located on and related only to that fann, that would be 
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considered commercial or industrial uses when perfonned commercially and independently of any 
particular farm. The purpose of the R-A Residential Agricultural District makes it clear that the 
Appellant's establishment of a trucking and/or hay hauling operation is inconsistent with pennitted 
uses in the zone: "The R-A residential agricultural zone is intended to provide areas for low density 
residential development and continuation of farm uses where compatible with each other." Filer City 
Code §9-5-1 (Emphasis supplied). The Appellant's use is not a continuation of a farm use, but rather 
establishment of a new commercial/industrial type use which is totally incompatible with residential 
use. 
Respondent seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. An award of attorney's fees is proper under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 if the Court is left with the "abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation." Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 
48,54,896 P.2d 956,962, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 179, 133 L.Ed.2d 118 (1995) 
(citing Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979)). 
While Respondent recognizes the burden placed on it to recover attorney fees under this section, 
Respondent believes that the burden is met in this case. Appellant's appeal is truly without merit 
given the language of the ordinances involved, the cardinal rules of statutory construction, and 
the undisputed facts of the case. Applying the rules of statutory construction to this case, no 
legitimate issue was raised by Appellant. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by the 
District Court should be affirmed, and Respondent should be awarded its attorney fees and costs 
in defending the appeal. 
DATED THIS 15th day of July, 2010. 
WONDERLICH & WAKEFIELD 
.~ By __________________________ _ 
Fritz A. Wonderlich 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the 15th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be hand-delivered to the following person via 
Courthouse Mail to: 
Tim J. Williams 
P.O. Box 282 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0282 
Frtiz A. Wonderlich 
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